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SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS
A National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) supported Reliability, Maintainability, and
Availability (RMA) analysis team developed a unique RMA
analysis methodology using cut set and importance measure
analysis in order to comparison model proposed avionics
computing architectures. In this paper we will present this
efficient application of the RMA analysis methodology for
importance measures that includes Reliability Block Diagram
(RED) Analysis, Comparison modeling, Cut Set Analysis, and
Importance Measure Analysis. We will also demonstrate that
integrating RMA early in the system design process as a key
to success by providing a fundamental decision metric
supporting design selection.
The RMA analysis methodology presented in this paper
and applied to the avionics architectures enhances the usual
way of predicting the need for redundancy based on failure
rates or subject matter expert opinion. Using the REDs and
the minimal cut sets, along with the Fussell-Vesely (FV)
factors, importance measures are calculated for each
functional element in the architectures [I]. This paper
presents an application of the FV importance measures and
presents an improved methodology for using importance
measures in success space (instead of failure space) to
compare architectures. These importance measures are used
to determine which functional element would be most likely to
cause a system failure, thus, quickly identifying the path to
increase the overall system reliability by either procuring more
reliable functional elements or adding redundancy [2].
This application of the RMA analysis methodology, using
RBD analysis, cut set analysis, and the importance measure
analysis, allows the avionics design team to better understand
and compare the vulnerabilities in each of the architectures,
enabling them to address the deficiencies in the design
architectures more efficiently, while balancing the need to
design for optimum weight and space allocations.
1 INTRODUCTION
A trade study was performed to evaluate various avionics
computing architectures from the perspectives of reliability,
mass, power, data integrity, software implementation, and
hardware and software integration for future NASA programs.
A set of RBD models were developed to analyze the reliability
of and rank the various computing system architectures.
These reliability analysis modules allowed for ease and
consistency in calculating reliability, cut sets, and importance
measures.
First the RED modules were created, and then cut set
analysis was performed to determine those functional elements
most likely to cause a failure within the architecture, i.e.,
which functional elements had the largest unreliability.
Finally, FV importance measures were calculated for each
functional element in each of the architectures. Then identical
functional elements were grouped to allow for comparison
between the architectures and provide the understanding of
which functional elements had the most significant impact on
system reliability.
2 SCOPE
This paper documents the reliability engineering
methodology developed for the RBD comparison, cut set
analysis, importance analysis, and improvement
recommendations for the architectures for future NASA
launch vehicles.
3 ASSUMPTIONS
To ensure that the RBD modules for each of the
architectures were comparable, repeatable, and auditable,
various assumptions were documented, including functional
element failure rates, fault tolerance, mission duration, and
cable and connector assumptions.
3.1 Functional element Failure Rates
The failure rates for the functional elements III the
architectures were estimated based on the existing avionics
system reliability databases. To facilitate comparison, the
same failure rates were assumed for the same functional
elements, interconnects, and topologies for the various
architectures. All functional elements were assumed to have
an exponential failure rate distribution. Due to the proprietary
nature of these failure rates, they will not be listed in this
paper.
The functional element failure rates were based on
existing avionics architectures used aircraft, and a failure rate
environmental conversion was made to the prediction (to SF
environment). The conversions were made in accordance with
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the System Reliability Center (SRC) environmental matrix [3].
3.2 Fault Tolerance
Avionics systems have evolved over time to incorporate
fault tolerance within the system architecture. The capability
to survive a functional element fault has driven multiple
avionics system configurations [4]. In the Delta family of
launch vehicles, the avionics systems have evolved over time
based on reliability and fault tolerance [5]. Several examples
of various avionic system architectures are plausible. The
NASA avionic architecture team selected the systems to be
evaluated based on fault tolerance capability.
The reliability analysis for the selected avionic systems to
be studied assumed one-fault tolerance for each function
element, i.e., more than one failure in any single functional
element was deemed to be a failure. The configuration of the
functional elements provided the fault tolerance capability.
For example, more than one of the three Inertial Navigation
Units (INU) would result in a system failure. In addition, only
hard or non-recoverable failures of the functional elements
were considered in the analysis. The impact of a functional
element operating in a degraded stated was not taken into
consideration.
For a self-checking pair (SCP) functional element
configuration, it was assumed that, for the flight computers,
switches, or buses, the self-checking pair consists of two flight
computers or two switches or two buses, which needed to have
data agreement to be successful. Therefore, the SCP
functional elements were in a series configuration for
reliability calculations (2-of-2 in agreement for success).
For a triplex voter (TV), the functional unit configuration
was assumed to consist of three functional units plus majority
voting logic, with the functional elements in a parallel
configuration for reliability calculations (2-of-3 in agreement
for success).
3.3 Channelized and Fully-Cross Strapped Configurations
A channelized configuration was assumed to be such that
only functional elements of the same channel could share data,
i.e., Flight Computer-l (FC-l) only shared data with switch-l
(SW-l), and SW-l could only share data with Data
Acquisition Unit-l (DAU-I), Main Propulsion System-l
(MPS-l), etc. Figure 1 shows the RED configuration of the
channelized architecture.
A fully-cross strapped (FCS) configuration was assumed
to be such that all functional elements could share data, i.e.,
FC-I could share data with all switches, and all switches could
share data with all instrumentation/sensors and
effectors/actuators. Figure 2 shows the RED configuration of
the SCP architecture.
3.4 Mission Duration
The reliability analysis was performed for a time period
of up to nine months (6,480 hours) for mission scenarios that
could potentially require an Earth departure stage and long
mission duration.
3.5 Cables and Cable Connectors
The different architectures were modeled with and
without cabling as part of the RED analysis. The request to
model cabling was made in order to identify a potential
difference when cabling is installed into the models. The
cable input to the functional element was modeled as having
their individual failure properties. The cabling assembly RED
"block" was assumed to be comprised of the cable, supports,
and connectors. The cable assembly was assumed to be routed
from the source to the destination individually.
4 RELIABILITYBLOCK DIAGRAMS (RED)
A RED provides a pictorial representation of the
architecture's reliability performance. The RED demonstrates
a logical connection of functional elements needed for system
success. The RED does not identify the avionics system
topology but rather the functional element logical connection
[6]. The particular assemblies identified by the RED blocks
identify system operational functions. Figure 1 shows the
Relex© RED representation of a SCP, channelized
architecture, and Figure 2 shows the Relex© RED
representation of a FCS, TV architecture.
Figure 1: Example ofSCP, Channelized Configuration RED
Figure 2: FCS, TV Configuration RED
The RED model does not demonstrate physical
configuration, cannot predict mass, does not estimate power
consumption, and cannot guarantee the reliability values
demonstrated are capable of being achieved. However, when
REDs from different architectures or systems have the same
assumptions (failure rates, fault tolerance, etc), the REDs can
provide the ability to rank architectures by order of magnitude
comparison, in which case the design engineer can determine
the most reliable system architecture [7].
The architecture RED calculations take into account the
objectives and related engineering defined aspects of each
system configuration from an assessment of operational
success. The RED is assembled in a success path for the
system. The series representation indicates a system in which
each block is dependent upon the success of the system.
Parallel block configurations indicate a group of blocks that
provide active redundancy or standby redundancy.
RELEX© was used as the primary reliability modeling
tool. The various architectures were modeled into different
RED configurations using the failure rates as identified in
Table 1. By using the same failure rates, the only variance in
results would be due to the RED configurations identifying the
variant in configuration of the architectures. This allows for a
normalized comparison of the architectures.
In the RELEX© model the operation simulation (OpSim)
model was used to depict the REDs. Results were calculated
using both analytical and Monte-Carlo Simulation calculations
with 1,000,000 iterations. For the Monte-Carlo Simulations,
the confidence level was set at 95%.
5 RED ANALYSIS AND RELIABILITY RESULTS
The various avionic architectures were evaluated; the
quantity of functional elements included in each, and the
redundancy configuration for each, and the architecture fault
tolerance are listed below:
1. Fully Cross-Strapped Switched Triplex Voter
(FCSSTV)
2. Partially Cross-Strapped Switched Triplex Voter
(PCSSTV)
3. Channelized Bussed Triplex Voter (CBTV)
4. Fully Cross-Strapped Self-Checking (FCSSC)
5. Fully Cross-Strapped Bussed Self-Checking
(FCSBSC)
6. Channelized Bussed Self-Checking (CBSC)
5.1 Architecture RED Reliability Results Summary
Figure 3 and Table 1 show the reliability results for the
six architectures. The reliability results are calculated at 9
months (6,480 hours) and include the failure contribution from
cabling.
Although these results were significant in eliminating two
of the architectures (CBTV and CBSC), additional RED
comparison data was needed to ensure the vulnerabilities of
each architecture was understood.
MIssion Ellapsed rime (MET) In Hrs
Figure 3: Architecture Reliability Comparison Results:
Reliability versus Mission Elapsed Time (MET)
Architecture R (6480 hrs)
FCSSTV 0.666999
PCSSTV 0.613596
CBTV 0.464581
FCSSC 0.648547
FCSBSC 0.646730
CBSC 0.389427
Table 1: Architecture Reliability Results
6 CUT SET ANALYSIS
Cut set analysis provides clear indication of where the
most likely failure paths would be depending on the accuracy
of the RED and the accuracy of the failure data of the
functional elements. A cut set is a set of basic events
[failures] where the joint occurrence of these basic events
results in the failure of the system [2]. Each cut set can
contain anywhere from one to all functional elements,
depending on the system architecture. A minimal cut set is
defined as a set that "cannot be reduced without losing its
status as a cut set" [8].
Once the minimal cut sets were identified, a comparison
was made to determine if the system with the least reliability
contained the most failure paths, thus, making a
recommendation for the most reliable architecture based on
the number of minimal failure paths. It was quickly
detennined that, in general, the more cut sets an architecture
had, the less reliable it tended to be. However, as the
difference in reliability between the architectures became
smaller, a conclusion as to the most reliable architecture could
not be drawn from the number of cut sets alone due to the
difference in number of functional elements and their
configuration in each of the architectures. Table 2 shows the
architectures ranked from most reliable to least reliable and
the number of minimal cut sets calculated for each
Architecture Reliability # of Minimal Cut Sets
FCSSTV 0.666999 75
FCSSC 0.648547 67
FCSBSC 0.646730 73
Architecture Reliability # of Minimal Cut Sets
PCSSTV 0.613596 195
CBTV 0.464581 267
CBSC 0.389427 304
Table 2: Architecture Ranking and Number ofMinimal Cut
Sets
7 IMPORTANCE MEASURES IN SUCCESS SPACE
Part of the decision analysis in selecting a specific
architecture includes determining which of the functional
elements can lead to high risk scenarios. In order to assess the
importance of functional elements in the architecture or the
sensitivity of the architecture reliability to changes in the
functional element's input failure rates, several importance (or
sensitivity) measures are available [2]. "Importance measures
quantify the criticality of a particular functional element
within a system design. They have been widely used as tools
for identifying system weakness, and to prioritize reliability
improvement activities." [9]
The various measures are based on slightly different
interpretations of the concept of functional element
importance. Intuitively, the functional element importance
should depend on the location of the functional element in the
system, the reliability of the functional element in question,
and the uncertainty in the estimate of functional element
reliability [10].
Typically, importance measures are used in failure space,
or for Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). However, these importance
factors can be defined in success space (RBD Analysis) by
calculating the measures based on the total success of the
system instead of the total risk. Some importance factors do
not preserve their meaning in success space; therefore, they
fail to rank the functional elements appropriately. However,
all importance measures provide one with a single number for
each functional element that can be used as part of a
comparative analysis.
There are five importance measures generally accepted
for use: Birnbaum, Criticality, Fussell-Vesely (FV), Risk
Reduction Worth (RRW), and Risk Achievement Worth
(RAW) [11]. The Birnbaum measure depends on the system
configuration and is typically used to determine the degree of
redundancy and appropriateness of the system's logic. The
Criticality measure is a weighted version of the Birnbaum,
which takes into account the ratio of functional element failure
probability and system reliability. The FV is the fractional
contribution of risk to the system of all scenarios containing
that specified functional element versus the contribution of all
failure scenarios in a system. The RAW is the ratio of the
conditional system unreliability if the functional element is not
present (always failed) with the actual system unreliability.
The RRW is the ratio of the actual system unreliability with
the (conditional system unreliability if the functional element
is replaced by a perfect functional element (never fails) [10].
Due to the limitation of the Relex© software program in
calculating importance measures in success space, all
importance measures had to be calculated by hand. The
Birnbaum, Criticality, RAW, and RRW measures proved
significantly time consuming, as the conditional reliability
calculations had to be made by performing multiple runs in
Relex© to obtain values (20 or more runs per architecture).
However, Relex© calculations quickly provided minimal cut
set unreliability values that could then be used to calculate the
FV for all functional elements.
Figure 4, Table 3, and Table 4 show the comparison of
the Birnbaum, Criticality, FV, RRW, and RAW results for the
functional elements in a single architecture. The Birnbaum
and Criticality measures yielded nearly identical results and
rankings when compared to each other. The FV measures
differed slightly from the Birnbaum and Criticality measures,
but the primary contributor to the unreliability of the
architecture (over 21 % of the unreliability in all three
measures) remained the same. The RRW and RAW measures
seemed to provide little value added when applied to the cut
sets in success space, with all functional elements having
similar contributions to the overall unreliability of the
architecture, appearing to be based on failure rate data alone.
Thus, making the RRW and RAW importance measures
seemingly unsuitable for use in success space.
When weighing the time needed to perform the
importance measure analysis versus the benefits that were to
be achieved, the FV was chosen in order to efficiently obtain
the quantitative importance measures for each functional
element for a comparative analysis.
Figure 4: Comparison of Various Importance Measure
Results
Birnbaum Criticality FV
FC 21.93% FC 21.32% FC 27.38%
INU 14.07% INU 14.92% PIC 18.54%
RGA 14.07% RGA 14.92% ECU 13.63%
PIC 12.62% PIC 11.01% HCU 12.62%
ECU 10.59% ECU 9.74% INU 10.74%
HCU 10.15% HCU 9.45% RGA 10.74%
DAU 4.36% DAU 4.72% DAU 2.54%
SW 3.97% SW 4.63% RCS 1.47%
RCS 3.30% RCS 3.67% MPS 1.47%
MPS 3.30% MPS 3.67% SW 0.76%
RRW RAW FV
FC 12.03% FC 13.42% FC 27.38%
INU 11.00% INU 11.97% PIC 18.54%
RGA 11.00% RGA 11.97% ECU 13.63%
SW 10.45% SW 9.65% RCU 12.62%
TVC 10.41% TVC 9.04% INU 10.74%
PIC 8.32% PIC 8.22% RGA 10.74%
ECU 7.88% ECU 7.94% DAU 2.54%
RCU 7.79% RCU 7.87% RCS 1.47%
DAU 7.09% DAU 6.80% MPS 1.47%
RCS 7.02% RCS 6.56% SW 0.76%
MPS 7.02% MPS 6.56% TVC 0.12%
Table 4: Comparison ofRRW, RA W, and FV Importance
Measure Results
7.1 Fussell- Vesely (FV)Importance for Functional Elements
The FV is the probability that at least one minimal cut set
that contains the functional element (i) has failed at time (t),
given that the system is failed at time (t) [10]. In other words,
the functional element FV is the sum of the unreliability of the
minimal cut sets containing the functional element, divided by
the sum of the unreliability of all of the system's minimal cut
sets.
The functional element FV can be expressed as
percentage contribution to unreliability of the overall system
(so that all functional element importance measures add to
100% of the system unreliability). The functional element FV
was divided by the sum of all functional element FVs to obtain
the percentage contribution. The FV reflects how much
relative improvement may be available from improving
performance of a specific functional element. Change in the
failure rates of the functional elements (or adding redundancy
to account for the high failure rate) with the highest FV
percent contribution will have the most significant effect on
increasing system reliability.
Once the functional element FV percent contributions
were calculated for all functional elements and all
architectures, a comparison of functional element importance
between the various architectures can be made. The
implementation of the FV to compare functional elements
within the different architectures proved somewhat more
involved than first anticipated. Most architectures contained
redundancy with two or more of the same functional element
functions within each; however, there was not a one-to-one
correspondence. For example, the TV architectures
(FCSSTV, PCSSTV, and CBTV) contained three FCs, while
the SCP architectures (FCSSC, FCSBSC, and CBSC)
contained four FCs. Therefore, the functional element
functions were grouped for comparison by summing the
contributions of all like-functional elements in the
architecture. Table 5 shows the example of how this was done
for FCs
Architecture FC-# FV% FC FV%
FC-l 9.12%
FCSSTV FC-2 9.12% FC 27.36%
FC-3 9.12%
FC-I 6.66%
PCSSTV FC-2 6.66% FC 19.98%
FC-3 6.66%
FC-I 15.83%
CBTV FC-2 7.63% FC 39.29%
FC-3 15.83%
FC-IA 8.35%
FCSSC FC-IB 8.35% FC 33.39%
FC-2A 8.35%
FC-2B 8.35%
FC-IA 8.51%
FCSBSC
FC-IB 8.51%
FC 34.04%
FC-2A 8.51%
FC-2B 8.51%
FC-IA 11.08%
CBSC
FC-IB 11.08%
FC 44.33%
FC-2A 11.08%
FC-2B 11.08%
Table 5: Example ofFunctIOnal element groupmgfor
Importance Measure Comparison
Once all functional element functions were grouped, a few
functions were unable to be compared. For example, CBTV
and CBSC had Bus functional element contributions, while the
other Architectures did not. Overall, though, this worked to
determine which functional elements were most likely to
cause a failure. The results are shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Functional element FV Calculations per
Architecture
The functional element importance measures provide the
designer with more information than a single reliability
calculation comparison may provide. Architecture selection is
made based not only on reliability calculations, but on weight,
space, cost, risk to the mission, etc, and the additional
importance measure calculations provide comparison data to
allow the designer to make more informed trade decisions in a
more efficient and effective manner. The difference in
vulnerabilities of the architectures can easily be compared
using the importance measure analysis.
Different distributions of the functional failure
contributions indicate different reliability improvement paths
for the architectures. Intermediate states can be modeled to
include the impact of failure data integrity on the reliability
and integrity of the architectures. These results can be used
not only to determine the most efficient and cost-effective way
to increase reliability of the architecture.
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